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Comment 
John Ziman 
Pietro Greco 
What pushed His Excellency Enrico Fermi, acclaimed Academician of Italy entitled to a state car and 
driver, to leave Italy all of a sudden in December 1938 in order to reach New York, after a short stop in 
Stockholm for the ceremony that celebrated him as a Nobel laureate for physics, and to accept a job as a 
simple physics lecturer at the Columbia University? 
A few weeks earlier, the Italian fascist government led by Benito Mussolini had approved its racial 
laws. Fermi’s wife, Laura Capon, was a Jew. Without any doubt, the newly-established and dangerous 
Italian situation ranks among the causes for the dramatic decision made by Fermi. 
Yet this was not exactly the crucial reason. After all, the wife of a recently-nominated Nobel laureate 
and Academician of Italy (who, after all, did not occupy a  public post), did not have much to fear from 
Mussolini’s racial laws. The main reason urging the most important atomic physician in the world to 
leave Italy must have been a different one. Fermi had realised that in order to carry on his pioneering 
research he needed funds and facilities Mussolini could not provide. An internal force was changing 
physics, requiring more and more resources and far better organisation. The United States of America 
appeared as a country capable of providing physicists with these resources and this organisation, whilst 
fascist Italy did not. 
Incidentally, while the Italian physicist was flying to the new world, the Berlin laboratories of Otto 
Hahn were bearing witness to the discovery of the uranium nucleus. What followed is a well-known 
story. Enrico Fermi was to play an essential role in what is referred to as the Manhattan Project, which 
only a few years later would turn a fundamental physics discovery into the deadliest weapon of mass 
destruction ever conceived by mankind. 
This story is familiar even among the general public. But there are two aspects historical popularisation 
has not specifically dealt with. Firstly, Enrico Fermi – considered as one of the pioneers of group work 
in physics, having gathered in the late twenties and early thirties five or six people to work together 
(referred to as “i ragazzi di via Panisperna”, the “Via Panisperna fellows”) – ended up in the forties 
working  on  a  single  technical  project  that  gathered  thousands  of  scientists  and  engineers  and  even 
hundreds of thousands of factory workers. Secondly, this community of academic scientists, technicians 
and industrial workers was actually working on commission: it had been given a precise task and huge 
endowments by the President of the United States of America himself. 
ermi’s passage from Italy to the US may be rightly regarded as a metaphor for a transition between one 
scientific era to another. It was one of the dramatic shifts in the social history of science. An era in which 
science need only limited resources gave way to a time in which huge resources were required. An era in 
which science could make do with a skimpy, self-centered social organisation gave way to time in which 
it demanded a lavish and complex social organisation, open towards society. 
This shift was not limited to the relations between science and the army. In the US a similar change 
was soon to take place also in a strictly civilian realm. On July the 25
th 1945, twelve days before the 
Hiroshima  bombing,  the  United  States  Government  Printing  Office  sent  to  the  newly-elected  US 
President, Harry S. Truman, a report entitled Science: The Endless Frontier signed by Vannevar Bush, 
the  mathematician  and  engineer  who  was  in  charge  of  the  Office  of  Scientific  Research  and 
Development and of the Manhattan project itself. 
The  report  claimed  that  academic  science  had  acquired  and  would  acquire  still  a  more  and  more 
strategic  value.  It  could  and  should  help  the  US  not  only  to  improve  military  security,  but  also  to 
increase the health and the economic well-being of its citizens. In order to achieve this, a federal agency 
was needed to fix the objectives and the methods to be followed for the best «basic research in colleges, 
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In short, even in times of peace and for civilian purposes, the government must invested in academic 
science. 
The consequences of the Bush report were tremendous. Not only was the agency actually founded 
(albeit only in 1950): what changed dramatically was the federal government’s attitude towards science. 
Investments in the scientific, academic and industrial, civilian and military system as a whole increased 
in an unprecedented way in American history. And, most likely, even in human history. 
A few figures will support this thesis. In 1930, as stated by Vannevar Bush himself, the United States 
of America invested 140 million dollars in scientific research and technological development (R&D). 
Ten years later, in 1940, this investment would have recorded a more-than-twofold increase: 309 million 
dollars. 
Taking inflation into account, this means that in 1930 the US invested in science and technology 1.5 
billion dollars (2005 dollars) and that over a decade it more than doubled its investments in real terms, 
reaching about 4 billion dollars (2005 dollars) in 1940. 
Later on, when the previously planned agency was born in 1953 under the name of National Science 
Foundation (NSF), the total US investment in R&D reached approximately 30 billion dollars: nearly a 
tenfold real-term increase in comparison with 1940. Quite a stride. Or rather, an authentic turning-point. 
It took a further fifty years to complete another duplication in numbers: today, the US investments in 
R&D amount approximately to 300 billion dollars per year. 
Still  in  1953,  the  NSF  management  was  not  entrusted  to  a  person  appointed  by  the  scientific 
community, as desired by Vannevar Bush. On the contrary, it was entrusted to a person appointed by the 
political authority, the President of the United States, as explicitly imposed by Truman himself after a 
startling dispute with the Congress. 
So, between 1945 and 1953 another transition took place: the expense for scientific research was no 
longer marginal in the economy of this World War II-winning country and became a macroeconomic 
data. Investments in R&D could then be measured by GDP units and not by more diminutive figures. 
And  the  “Autonomous  Republic  of  Science”  maintained  unprecedented  relations  with  political 
institutions  in  times  of  peace.  Consequently,  the  American  scientific  community  –  and,  in  a  rapid 
sequence, the scientific communities of most of the industrialised world– had an exceptional quantity of 
resources at its disposal. All of this in exchange of a (slight) surrender of autonomy and the availability 
to work on large nationally-relevant projects commissioned by the State. 
To say that similar processes in qualitative terms had previously taken place outside the US does not 
carry any weight. As in Germany or in Italy, for example – in the latter thanks to the action promoted by 
Vito Volterra. Indeed, it is quantity that counts here, not quality. 
The  quantity  of  resources  and  the  massive  size  of  the  manpower  employed  made  the  scientific 
community  that  emerged  from  this  process,  launched  in  the  US  and  rapidly  spread  all  over  the 
industrialised world, a new scientific community. Literally brand new. After World War II, the number 
of living and working scientists was higher than the total sum of the scientists ever lived in the previous 
ages. 
This was a truly dramatic turn. Its size and consequences can probably compare only to two events in 
the social history of science. The 17
th century saw the occurrence of what is often referred to as the 
“scientific revolution” and the birth of the “Republic of Science”, as named by Paolo Rossi. And the 19
th 
century saw the institutionalisation of the scientific community in universities and the consequent birth 
of “academic science”. 
This third “dramatic turn” occurred in the aftermath of the Second World War has been analysed by 
many, although only a few have been able to fully understand its importance. Certainly John Ziman is 
one of them, being the first to deal with “collectivised science” and the novelties it brought about. The 
term “collectivised” means that the working method of scientists is no longer centred on the individual 
(or small groups), but on large collectives. But it also means that the role played by the scientists’ work, 
although  counting  on  a  substantial  epistemological  autonomy,  falls within a wider national interest. 
Science – even academic science – becomes a part of a larger enterprise. 
An outstanding intuition for a physicist without a specific education on social science. While this age 
transition was still in progress, John Ziman recognised some of its aspects that had not been grasped yet, 
not even by professional sociologists. At least, not with the same clear vision. These aspects are: science 
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science enter – owing to internal and external forces – a new development phase, characterised by great 
resources, large research groups and the collapse of the old ivory tower. A demise unavoidably implying 
a  scientific  activity  management  enlarged  to  heterogeneous  groups  of  “non-experts”,  a  deeper 
interpenetration made also of conflicts between science and society, and the unprecedented fact that 
crucial decisions for the development of science are taken by scientists in collaboration with other social 
groups of “non-expert” people. 
Unlike  from  the  majority  of  scholars  –  although  similarly  to  major  scholars  –  Ziman  showed  his 
personal participation, and sometimes his suffering, in describing this process. He was not a sterile 
analyst. He was an involved protagonist of this change. But this does not dimish his analysis skills. 
Indeed, Ziman was among the first to realise this new phase of the change, the one he defined by the 
term  «post-academic  transition».  This  means  that  around 1980 the market breaks into the scientific 
evolutionary system. Along with its additional resources. And its culture. Thanks to Margaret Thatcher 
in the UK, of course. But also and above all thanks to the approval of the Bayh-Dole Act and some 
patent-related sentences by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Once again, the United States was a forerunner and a leader at the same time. This new model found 
many followers around the world. 
And once again Ziman fully realised the scale of the irruption by market instruments, and by a market 
culture in particular, into the “Republic of Science”. He understood that for the first time it was making 
its members face the competition between the ancient Merton’s scheme of values (CUDOS), and a new 
pragmatic and utilitarian scheme (PLACE). A competition which today is more active than ever and 
remains unsolved. 
This is why the “Republic of Science” features important vestiges of an ancient scientists’ working 
method together with powerful injections of a new market-oriented – so to speak – working method. 
Although  John  Ziman  showed  once  again  he  experienced  this  transition  with  pain,  this  does  not 
impoverish the clear vision of his analysis, but rather enriches it. His view is still slightly more advanced 
than the one emerging from the community of Science and Technology Studies. 
But this physicist gifted with a great sociological intuition had much to teach also to those dealing 
specifically  with  science  communication.  More  than  others  he  highlighted  that  science  is  a  social 
institution based on two pillars: the study of nature and the communication of its results. 
The former is the “private” phase of science (also when it is carried out by groups and even by large 
groups of scientists). The latter is the “public” phase. Ziman has the merit of having insisted that the first 
phase of the scientific activity, the one producing new knowledge, is not enough: without the second 
“public”  phase,  without  the  communication  on  the  newly-acquired  knowledge,  there  is  no  science. 
Communication is the real connective tissue of the “Republic of Science”. 
Yet apparently many historians and nearly all of the science philosophers have not realised it. 
But there is still one aspect that Ziman did not fully understand. And this is the new role that science 
communication addressed to a public (to various audiences) of “non-experts” has acquired, especially in 
the era of collectivised and post-academic science. 
Indeed, when the crucial decisions for the development of science were taken essentially within the 
ivory tower, by the members of the “invisible colleges” – as it happened during the academic era – then 
communicating science to a “non-expert” audience could rightly be regarded as an unessential addition 
to  the  general  system  of  science  communication.  Indeed,  the  only  relevant  communication  was 
essentially peer-to-peer communication: from expert to expert. 
But after the collapse of the ivory tower, after the doors and the windows of the “Republic of Science” 
were opened to politics, economy, society, then science communication between “experts” and “non-
experts”, even science communication from “non-expert” to “non-expert”, without even a slight hint of 
the role played by experts, has acquired a crucial role. It affects significantly the development of science 
and society. 
This type of communication should not be experienced with suffering or ill-concealed endurance, as 
many  scientists  still  do  and  as  Ziman  apparently  did.  On  the  contrary,  it  should  be  accepted  and 
interpreted in a creative and dynamic way. If this communication is enhanced, in all of its joints and 
nerves, everyone will benefit from it. Experts and “non-experts”. Science and society. 
Erio Tosatti, in this special issue devoted to our friend and master John Ziman, talks to us about the 
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by  Abdus  Salam  and  Paolo Budinich, found a suitable way to make science not for the benefit of 
someone in particular, but for all of humankind. 
Ana María Vara tells about the way John Ziman became an insider not only in the community of 
physicists, but also in the young community dealing with “science and society”. 
Helga  Nowotny  tells  about  the  way  John  Ziman  remained  substantially  an  outsider  in  both 
communities. His research path was too original, his character was too refractory to any pre-determined 
epistemological rule to fit in rigid discipline divisions. But this original feature is precisely what is 
needed to understand the new and complex dynamics driving science and society. 
Translated by Massimo Caregnato 
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